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IMMIGRATION LAW 
I. INS VIOLATIONS OF ITS OWN REGULATIONS: 
RELIEF FOR THE ALIEN 
Terry Helbush* 
In recent years, the Ninth Circuit has indicated it is recep-
tive to arguments by aliens that the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service (the Service) has not followed proper procedures 
in deciding their cases. Increasingly, the Ninth Circuit has been 
willing to grant relief to an alien in cases in which the Service 
violates a regulation or imposes additional burdens not found in 
the statute or regulation. This Article will discuss in detail three 
recent Ninth Circuit decisions exemplifying this trend and sug-
gest how these cases may be used and expanded in the future. 
A. Tejeda-Mata v. INS: FAILURE TO FOLLOW INS REGULATIONS 
APPLIED IN DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS 
In Tejeda-Mata v. INS,1 the Ninth Circuit for the first time 
directly applied the rationale of United States v. Calderon-Me-
dinal and United States v. Rangel-Gonzales' to deportation 
proceedings. In the latter two cases, the Ninth Circuit found 
that aliens who face prosecution for illegal entry after deporta-
tion may raise as a defense the Service's failure to follow its own 
regulations in effecting their deportation, thereby rendering 
their deportation invalid.· In Tejeda-Mata, the court applied 
the same defense in a deportation proceeding itself. II 
• Member of the California Bar; B.A., 1967, University of California, Santa Barbara; 
J.D., 1976, Golden Gate University School of Law. 
1. 626 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Bartels, D.J., sitting by designation; the other 
panel members were Choy and Ferguson, J.J.). 
2. 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979). 
3. 617 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1980). 
4. United States v. Rangel-Gonzales, 617 F.2d at 533; United States v. Calderon-
Medina, 591 F.2d at 531. 
5. In Tejeda-Mota, however, the court found that because the alien had not raised 
the defense in the deportation proceedings below, he was precluded from raising it on a 
217 
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The Calderon-Medina court instituted a two-pronged test: 
The regulation in question must benefit the alien, and the Ser-
vice violation must have prejudiced interests of the alien which 
the regulation protects.' The regulation in question in all three 
cases requires the Service to communicate with consular or dip-
lomatic officials upon detaining nationals of certain countries." 
The Service did not notify the Consul of Mexico in any of these 
cases even though the aliens were Mexican nationals, and Mex-
ico and the United States maintained a treaty calling for imme-
diate notification. 
The rationale behind Calderon-Medina itself and behind 
applying it in the deportation context is much the same as that 
in traditional estoppel cases:,,·1 The Service should not profit 
from its own procedural irregularities.' The theory of Calderon-
Medina, however, potentially has greater reach when applied to 
deportation proceedings because it is not tied to a finding of af-
firmative misconduct."1 In other words, it does not depend on 
some kind of "fault" or "intent" which affirmative misconduct 
seems to connote.' 
In addition, the Calderon-Medina theory, as applied to de-
portation actions through Tejeda-Mota, could have a wide ap-
plication in immigration proceedings because it specifically is 
not tied to the due process clause. Although previous immigra-
tion cases have found that the Service's failure to follow its own 
regulations may render a proceeding unfair,IO Calderon-Medina 
petition for review. 626 F.2d at 726. 
6. United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d at 532. 
7. 8 C.P.R. § 242.2(e) (1980). Section 242.2(e) provides: 
Priuilege of Communication. Every detained alien shall 
be notified that he may communicate with the coDllular or dip-
lomatic officera or the country or his nationality in the United 
States. Existing treaties require immediate communication 
with appropriate consular or diplomatic officera whenever na-
tionals of the following countries are detained in exclusion of 
expulsion proceedings, whether or not requested by the alien, 
and, in fact, even if the alien request. that no communication 
be undertaken in his behalf . . . . 
Mexico is one of the enumerated countries. 
7.1 See, e.g., Comeil-Rodriguez v. INS, 532 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1976). 
S. See United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d at 531. 
S.l INS v. Hibi, 414 U.S. 5 (1973). 
9. Santiago v. INS, 526 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976). 
10. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 153 (1945). 
2
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did not rely on the due process clause in reaching its result. In 
Calderon-Medina, the court carefully pointed out that the Ser-
vice's failure to follow a regulation-even when the violation in 
question was not of such a degree as to render the proceeding 
unfair-could invalidate a deportation proceeding.ll Thus, the 
Calderon-Medina theory may be raised as an alternate or com-
plementary theory when an alien complains of procedural irreg-
ularities in deportation proceedings. 
Matter of Garcia-Flores,12 a Board of Immigration Appeals 
case, illustrates the usefulness of the Calderon-Medina theory in 
defending against deportation even when a defense based on a 
due process argument undoubtedly would have failed. The alien 
in Garcia-Flores complained that prior to giving a statement to 
an immigration officer she was not advised of her right to coun-
sel.18 She therefore argued that the evidence presented against 
her at the hearing was inadmissible because it all resulted from 
questioning by the immigration officer. Any argument that the 
evidence should be excluded under the fourth amendment would 
have failed because the Board of Immigration Appeals has held 
that the exclusionary rule does not apply in deportation pro-
11. 591 F.2d at 531. 
12. I. & N. Dec. No. 2780 (Feb. 27, 1980). 
13. Section 287.3 then provided in part: 
An alien arrested without a warrant of arrest under the 
authority contained in section 287(a)(2) of the Immigration 
and Nationality Act shall be examined as therein provided by 
an officer other than the arresting officer, unless no other qual· 
ified officer is readily available and the taking of the alien 
before another officer would entail unnecessary delay, in which 
event the arresting officer, if the conduct of such examination 
is a part of the duties assigned to him, may examine the 
alien. . . . If the examining officer is satisfied that there is 
prima facie evidence establishing that the arrested alien is in 
the United States in violation of the immigration laws, further 
action in the case shall be taken as provided in Part 242 of 
this chapter. An alien arrested without warrant of arrest shall 
be advised of the reason of his own arrest and his right to be 
represented by counsel of his own choice, at no expense to the 
Government. . . . He shall also be advised that any statement 
he makes may be used against him in a subsequent proceeding 
and that a decision will be made within 24 hours or less as to 
whether he will be continued in custody or released on bond 
or recognizance. 
8 C.F.R. § 287.3 (1977). 
3
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ceedings.14 Although she could have maintained that her sta~­
ments to the immigration officer were involuntary because she 
was not advised of her right to counsel, 111 that would have been a 
difficult argument given the standard of voluntariness and the 
facts in her case. The Board, however, remanded her case to the 
immigration judge under the authority of Calderon-Medina for 
a finding as to whether the failure to advise her of the right to 
c9unsel was prejudicial. 
While Garcia-Flores, Tejeda-Mata and the previous cases 
involved violations of regulations directly related to the appre-
hension of aliens, their detention and deportation hearing proce-
dures, nothing in any of the cases indicated that the theory 
should be limited to cover only violations of those kinds of regu-
lations. Presumably, the theory would also encompass violations 
of regulations relating, for instance, to the filing and adjudica-
tion of applications for benefits under the immigration law, if 
prejudice could be shown. For this reason also, Calderon-
Medina and Tejeda-Mata will undoubtedly have a far-reaching 
effect. 
B. Patel v. INS AND Bahat v. Sureck: ADJUDICATORY RULE-
MAKING AND NOTICE 
Patel v. INSl. and Bahat v. Sureckl7 involved similar fact 
situations. Both Patel and Babat applied for permanent resident 
status on the basis of investments in the United States. II Both 
14. Matter of Sandoval, I. & N. Dec. No. 2725 (Aug. 20, 1979). 
15. Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803 (lat Cir. 1977); Matter of Garcia, I. & N. Dec. 
No. 2778 (Feb. 20, 1980). 
16. 638 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were 
Skopil, J. and Markety, C.J., sittiDa by designation). 
17. 637 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Boochever, J.; the other panel members were 
Hug, J. and Richey, D.J., sitting by designation). 
18. Both BOught residency under the nonpreference category, arguing that they were 
exempt from the labor certification requirement of § 212(a)(14) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14) (1976), because they fen within the business in-
vestor exception established by regulation in 1967 (8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b)(4) (1967». Sec-
tion 212(a)(14) provides that potential immigrants are excludable from the United States 
if they are: 
Aliens seeking to enter the United States, for the purpose 
of performing skilled or unskilled labor, unless the Secretary 
of Labor baa determined and certified to the Secretary of 
State and the Attorney General that (A) there are not suffi-
cient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally quali-
fied in the case of aliens who are members of the teaching pro-
4
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sought to qualify for permanent residence under a 1973 regula-
tion governing business investors. That regulation required that 
in order to qualify for permanent residence as a business inves-
tor an alien must establish 
that he is seeking to enter the United States for 
the purpose of engaging in a commercial or agri-
cultural enterprise in which he has invested, or is 
actively in the proce88 of investing capital totaling 
at least $10,000, and who establishes that he has 
at least 1 year's experience or training qualifying 
him to engage in such an enterprise. II 
Although Patel and Bahat met the regulation requirements, the 
Service denied their applications for permanent residence be-
cause they failed to satisfy a third requirement-that the invest-
ment "must tend to expand job opportunities and thus offset 
any adverse impact which the alien's employment may have on 
the market for jobs."'O 
This third requirement was enunciated in Matter of 
Heitland,1I a Board of Immigration Appeals case in which an 
investor applied for permanent residence under the 1967 versioD 
of the regulation governing business investors. U Although the 
earlier regulation required only that the investor "had invested a 
substantial amount of capital,"·' the Board found that to insure 
fession or who have exceptional ability in the sciences or the 
arts), and available at the time of application for a visa and 
admission to the United States and at the place where the 
alien is to perform such skilled or unskilled labor and (B) the 
employment of such aliens will not adversely dect the wages 
and working conditions of the workers in the United States 
similarly employed. 
8 U.S.C. § 1~82(a)(14) (1976). 
19. 8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b)(4) (1973). 
20. Matter of Heitland, 14 I. & N. Dec. 563, 567 (1974), aff'd, 551 F.2d 495 (2d Cir.), 
cen. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977), quoted in Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d at 1202. 
21. 14 I. & N. Dec. 563 (1974), aff'd, 551 F.2d 459 (2d. Cu.), cen. denied, 434 U.s. 
819 (1977). 
22. The 1967 version of § 212.8(b)(4) provided in relevant part: 
The following persons are not considered to be within the 
purview of section 212(a)(14) of the Act and do not require 
labor certification: ... (4) an alien who will engage in a com-
mercial or agricultural enterprise in which he had invested or 
is actively in the process of investing a substantial amount of 
capital. 
8 C.F.R. § 212.8(b)(4) (1967). 
23.Id. 
5
Helbush: Immigration Law
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982
222 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:217 
that the investor alien's primary function would not be to per-
form skilled or unskilled labor, the investment should also tend 
to expand job opportunities.14 
In Heitland, the Board indicated that it would apply the 
. "job-creation criterion"lIJ to cases arising under the 1973 version 
of code section 212.8(b)(4)18 as well, and did so in Matter of 
Ruangswang.17 Thus, the Board's decisions in Bahat and Patel 
relied on both Heitland and Ruangswang. 
The Ninth Circuit reversed the Board's decisions in Bahat 
and Patel on two grounds: (1) the dictum in the 1973 Heitland 
decision gave inadequate notice to Bahat and Patel that their 
investments would be required to satisfy the job-creation crite-. 
rion; and (2) the Board could not enunciate through adjudicative 
means a rule which is properly created through the regulatory 
process. 
In finding no adequate notice, the Ninth Circuit relied on 
its earlier case, Ruangswang v. INS," wherein the court had re-
versed the Board and found that the dictum in Heitland gave 
inadequate notice to Ruangswang since she had applied prior to 
the Heitland decision.·t 
In Bahat and Patel, the aliens made their investments in 
1976, some two years after the Heitland decision. The Ninth 
Circuit found, however, that since the rule as applied to the 1973 
regulation was only dictum in Heitland, and was somewhat ob-
scure and confusing at that, the rule failed to provide adequate 
notice. 
In Patel, the court fully developed its argument that appli-
cation of the Heitland decision to the 1973 regulation circum-
vented the rulemaking procedure. The Patel court premised its 
analysis on the fact that the Service as an agency had requested 
the Heitland requirement at the time the 1973 regulation was 
24. 14 I. & N. Dec. at 567. 
25. The term "job-creation criterion" is ODe coined by the court in Patel v. INS, 638 
F.2d at 1204. 
26. 14 I. & N. Dec. at 566-67. 
27. 16 I. & N. Dec. 76 (1976). 
28. 591 F.2d 39 (9th Cu. 1978). 
29. Id. at 45. 
6
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proposed. The original Service proposal for the 1973 regulation 
called for a minimum investment of $25,000 in an enterprise 
"reasonably . . . expected to be of prospective benefit to the 
economy of the United States and not intended solely to provide 
a livelihood for the investor and his family."ao However, while 
the Service normally proposed the dual requirements of a 
$25,000 investment and an expansion of job opportunities, it in-
stead promulgated the dual requirements of a $10,000 invest-
ment and one year's experience. Consequently the court found 
that when the Board in Heitland grafted the job-creation crite-
rion onto the 1973 regulation, it sought to do through the adju-
dicative process what the Service appeared unable to achieve 
through the rulemaking process. 
The Patel court found that the Board circumvented the 
rulemaking procedure thereby abusing its discretion. In its find-
ing, the Patel court relied primarily on NLRB u. Wyman-
Gordon Co.1l In Wyman-Gordon, the Supreme Court invali-
dated a rule created by the National Labor Relations Board in 
an agency decision.81 The Court concluded that the NLRB rule 
was "an agency statement of general or particular applicability 
and future effect" and that the Administrative Procedure Act 
(the APA) forbade its promulgation in an adjudicative proceed-
ing.as The Ninth Circuit, in Patel, held that the Heitland rule as 
applied to the 1973 regulation was similar to the NLRB rule in 
Wyman-Gordon because "it was the prospective pronouncement 
of a broad, generally applicable requirement, without applica-
tion of the requirement to the parties"84 actually before the 
Board. 
The reasoning of the court in Patel and the results reached 
in both decisions are significant for future immigration cases in 
30. 37 Fed. Reg. 23,274 (1974), quoted in Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d at 1202. 
31. 394 U.S. 759 (1969). 
32. Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966). 
33. Section 1 of the Administrative Procedure Act provides definitions to be fol-
lowed in applying the Act. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1976). It defines adjudication 88 an "agency 
process for the formulation of an order." 1d. § 551(7). An order is the "final disposition 
... of an agency in a matter other than rulemaking." 1d. § 551(6). Rulemaking means an 
"agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule." 1d. § 551(5). 
A rule is an "agency statement of general or particular applicability and future ef-
fect." 1d. § 551(4). Thus, by tracing the definitions, it is evident that a statement of 
future effect is a rule and therefore not allowed in an adjudicatory proceeding. 
34. Patel v. INS, 638 F.2d at 1203. 
7
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two important ways. First, Patel indicates a willingness on the 
Ninth Circuit's part to look outside the immigration field for 
guidance in immigration cases and to apply the AP A to the im-
migration field. All too often, immigration practioners presume 
conclusively that the AP A does not apply to immigration cases. 
While it is true that the AP A has been found inapplicable to 
deportation and exclusion procedures,la in other ways the APA 
can have a significant applicability in the immigration field, as 
shown by this case. Ie 
Second, the results reached in Bahat and Patel seem to in-
dicate an unwillingness by the Ninth Circuit to accept the Ser-
vice's attempts· to graft additional requirements onto statutes 
and regulations. In this way, these cases are similar to the recent 
decisions Palmer. v. Reddyl' and Dabaghian v. Civiletti." In 
Palmer, the court held the Service requirement that a steppar-
ent who petitions for her stepchild must show a "close family 
unit" exceeded the statutory language of section lOl(b)(l)(B) of 
the Immigration and Nationality Act, as it defines stepchild. Ie In 
Dabaghian, the Service attempted to rescind the alien's perma-
nent resident status on the ground that he was ineligible for sta-
tus as the spouse of an American citizen. The court ruled that 
the INS could not read into the word "spouse" a requirement 
that the marriage be viable or subsisting. '0 
Undoubtedly, the Service has wide discretion in determin-
ing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding. Nonetheless, 
the agency must not use the adjudicative process to replace ei-
ther the legislative or the regulatory process. Nor can an agency 
announce a rule in the adjudicative process contrary to a statute 
or regulation. In addition, Patel and Bahat indicate that in cer-
tain circumstances the court will find on the basis of inadequate 
notice that an adjudicative rUle announced in one decision can-
not be applied to other cases. 
35. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955). See generally 2 C. GORDON & E. ROSEN· 
PIBLD, IMMIGRATION LAw AND PROCEDURE, § 8.12b, at 8·106 (1981). 
36. See also Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976 (E.D. Pa. 1977). 
37. 622 F.2d 463 (9th Cir. 1980). 
38. 607 F.2d 868 (9th Cir. 1979). 
39. 622 F.2d at 464. 
40. 607 F.2d at 871. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
The frustrations for immigration lawyers and aliens in deal-
ing with the Service are great. The Service operates with a 
shortage of personnel and under an internally contradictive and 
antiquated statute while the aliens' rights and real options for 
legal immigration are often severely limited. It is no wonder that 
aliens are increasingly looking for means to bring their cases 
before the courts. The Ninth Circuit, in cases like those dis-
cussed above, has opened the door slightly to aliens' complaints. 
Immigration lawyers and aliens will certainly seek to push that 
door open wider in future years. It is equally certain that the 
Reagan administration intends to limit aliens' access to the fed-
eral court system.41 The questions of the scope of judicial review 
of Service actions and of the propriety of Service procedures are 
ones which will be hotly debated in the next years both in the 
legislative and judicial arenas. 
II. UPDATE-TAPIA-ACUNA v. INS: THE NINTH 
CIRCUIT ADOPTS FRANCIS 
In Tapia-Acuna v. INS,l the Ninth Circuit adopted the ra-
tionale of Francis v. INS,· in which the Second Circuit extended 
section 212(c) relief to an alien who is otherwise deportable 
under section 241(a)(11) and has not left the United States since 
first immigrating. Petitioner Tapia-Acuna, a lawful permanent 
resident alien, was convicted of possession of marijuana for sale. 
Subsequently, the Immigration and Naturalization Service initi-
ated deportation proceedings under section 241(a)(11) of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act (the Act).8 Finding petitioner de-
41. Such proposals are found in S. 176588 proposed to the Senate. 127 CONGo REC. 
Sl1,996-97 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1981). 
1. 640 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Ferguson, J.; the other panel members were 
Goodwin, J. and Skelton, D.J., sitting by designation). 
2. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976). 
3. Section 241(a)(11) provides in pertinent part: 
Any alien in the United States (including an alien crew-
man) shall, upon the order of the Attorney General, be de-
ported wh~ 
(11) is, or hereafter at any time after entry has been, a 
narcotic drug addict, or who at any time has been convicted of 
9
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portable, the immigration judge denied his application for 
section 212(c) relief.· Mter the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(the BIA) affirmed, petitioner sought review in the Ninth 
Circuit. 
While his petition was pending in the Ninth Circuit, peti-
tioner moved to reopen his case based on a state court order 
expunging his conviction. The BIA denied petitioners request 
based on recent Ninth Circuit decisions that found an alien who 
is deportable under section 241(a)(1l) of the Act ineligible for 
section 212(c) relief. Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
BIA denial, the Supreme Court vacated the decision and ordered 
the Ninth Circ\lit to reconsider its position based on the Solici-
tor General's assertion that aliens deportable under section 
241(a)(1l) are eligible for section 212(c) relief. 
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the fact that although sec-
tion 212(c) refers only to grounds for exclusion, it has also been 
readily applied to deportation proceedings. Past Ninth Circuit 
decisions have denied the possibility of section 212(c) relief in 
cases where the alien has not voluntarily departed from and re-
turned to the United States.' A recent Second Circuit case, how-
ever, found such interpretations of section 212(c) violative of 
due process. In Francis v. INS,' the Second Circuit faced a fact 
situation similar to that in Tapia-Acuna. The Francis court 
found that because section 212(c) relief is afforded to aliens who 
depart and return to the United States, it should be equally 
available to aliens who have remaine'd in the United States 
a violation of . . . any law or regulation relating to the illicit 
possession of or traffic in narcotic drugs or marihuana, or who 
has been convicted of a violation of . . . any law or regulation 
governing or controlling . . . the sale . . . of opium, cocoa 
leaves, berion, marihuana . . . . 
8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(11) (1976). 
4. Section 212(c) provides that "[a]liens lawfully admitted for permanent residence 
who temporarily proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportetion, 
and who are returning to a lawfully unrelinquished domicile of seven consecutive years, 
may be admitted in the discretion of the Attorney General without regard to the provi-
sions of [§§ 241(a)(l) to 241(a)(25)]." 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (1976). 
5. See Dunn v. INS, 499 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1106 (1975); 
Arias-Uribe v. INS, 466 F.2d 1198 (9th Cir. 1972). Section 212(c) relief requires that the 
alien voluntarily depart and return to the United States. See note 4 supra for the rele-
vant text of § 212(c). 
6. 532 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1976). 
10
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continuously.' 
The Tapia-Acuna court further noted that the BIA has vol-
untarily adopted the Francis rationale and rejected the previous 
distinction.8 Several Ninth Circuit cases decided after Francis, 
however, have continued to extend section 212(c) relief only to 
aliens that have voluntarily departed and returned.9 Rejecting 
these earlier decisions as having "create[d] a distinction that 
lacks a rational basis,"lo the Tapia-Acuna court adopted Fran-
cis and extended section 212(c) relief to an otherwise eligible 
alien regardless of any prior departure and reentry to the United 
States. 
Tapia-Acuna ends a series of Ninth Circuit decisions which 
. have distinguished cases on the basis of a totally irrelevant con-
sideration.ll With Tapia-Acuna, the Ninth Circuit has caught 
up with the Second Circuit and the BIA and reversed an un-
healthy trend in this circuit. 
7. ld. at 271-73. 
8. See Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 582 (1978); Matter of Hom, 16 I. & N. 
Dec. 112, 113-14 (1977); Matter of Silva, 16 I. & N. Dec. 26, 29-30 (1976). 
9. Bowe v. INS, 597 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1979); Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802 (9th 
Cir. 1979). 
10. 640 F.2d at 225. 
11. For an exce\1ent discussion of this issue, see Hing, The Ninth Circuit: No Place 
for Drug Offenders, 10 GOLDEN GATE V.L. REV. 1 (1980). 
11
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